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Ransdell v. Clark County,
124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 73 (September 25, 2008)1
Property – Sovereign Immunity – Constitutional Law
Summary
Appeal from a district court order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint of negligence
and entering orders of partial summary judgment for other tort and constitutional claims.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed. The Nevada Supreme Court held that NRS 41.032(2) provides
immunity to the County with regard to nuisance abatement because the process is
discretionary and performed by a sovereign entity. Likewise, Plaintiff’s due process and
equal protection claims were denied.
Factual and Procedural History
Appellant Gary Ransdell owned residential property in Clark County, Nevada.
The County Public Response office received a nuisance complaint regarding the
condition of his property. The complaint noted that his property was cluttered with
trailers, vehicles and trash items. Per County procedure, the inspector Al Dixon, inspected
the property on May 2, 2003 and issued the first notice that Ransdell was in violation of
various Clark County code provisions. After no response from Ransdell, Dixon issued a
formal notice of violation, specifically noting the existence of solid waste, junk vehicles,
unlicensed and inoperable vehicles and using a residential zone for storage.
After further formal notices, with no response from Ransdell, Dixon forwarded
the case to the County Inspector. The County Inspector evaluated the property on
September 22, 2003 at which time she posted a notice of abatement. This notice indicated
that Ransdell had the right to pursue an administrative appeal within ten days or the
County would begin abatement procedures. Although Randsell failed to appeal formally,
he requested and had an on site meeting with the County Inspector. After this meeting he
was given until January 29, 2004 to comply with the notice of abatement. He, however,
failed to remove any of the nuisance items by the necessary date.
The justice court then issued a warrant that allowed the County to enter onto the
property and seize items and record the items that were taken pursuant to the abatement
order. The county completed the abatement over a three day period and seized various
items including vehicle parts, tires, engines, parts of bicycles, tarps, chairs and garbage.
Following this removal Ransdell filed a civil complaint that included eight causes of
action and punitive damages.
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Ransdell claims that his constitutional procedural and substantive due process and
equal protection rights had been violated and also pleaded tort claims, including trespass
to land and chattels, conversion, nuisance and negligence. In its answer, the county
denied allegations and included several affirmative defenses. One of the primary defenses
was sovereign immunity for discretionary governmental actions. Ransdell also filed a
motion to return the items seized but was denied by the district court because there
appeared to be adequate due process and the warrant was issued and abatement
performed with probable cause and was reasonable.
The County filed motions to dismiss and for orders of partial summary judgment.
The district court granted the County’s motion and found that the County was entitled to
immunity under NRS 41.032(2) for all of the tort claims. It also found that the
substantive due process claim failed as the law was not “impermissibly vague.” They
further found that because Ransdell failed to exercise his administrative appeal and the
County fulfilled its requirements under the warrant, no genuine issue of fact remained.
The punitive damages were likewise covered by the immunity statute on which the court
had previously relied.
Discussion
Sovereign Immunity – Tort Claims
Ransdell raised several arguments on appeal. The first questioned the sovereign
immunity from tort liability provided by NRS 41.032(2), which states: No action may be
brought against … the state or its agencies based upon the … failure to perform a
discretionary function or duty….” The court used Martinez v. Maruszczac2, a recently
decided case which dealt with the same issue. The same test was used to determine
whether this statute providing sovereign immunity applies.
The test as found in Martinez, which originated in Berkovitz v. United States3
provides that government actions fall within the scope of discretionary-act immunity
when they 1) involve an element of individual judgment or choice and 2) are based on
considerations of social, economic or political theory. 4 The court reasoned that the first
element of this test was met as individual judgment or choice was exercised 5 as the
county had to use its discretion to apply the code which provided that abatement was
possible where visible debris or rubbish would be offensive to the public. Thus the
inspectors used their own judgment as to the condition of the property.
The second part of the test was also met. The court found that generally speaking,
the procedures dealing with abatement have strong public policy motives oriented to
issues of health, safety and public welfare. In Goodman v. City of Le Claire6 the Iowa
123 Nev. ___, 168 P.3d 720
486 U.S. 531 (1988).
4
Id. at 536.
5
Clark County Code § 11.06.010(c).
6
587 N.W. 2d 232 (Iowa 1998).
2
3

Supreme Court used this test and under similar factual elements concluded that waste and
nuisance cause damage to the environment and also subject the community to adverse
economic consequences.7 This Court followed the reasoning in Goodman and found that
environmental, health, and economic policies supported the relevant wording in the code.
Therefore the two part test of discretion and public policy concerns applied to Clark
County in this instance.
Constitutional Claims
The term “inoperative automobiles” was not unconstitutionally vague. The court
noted that the County Code is presumed to be constitutionally valid and to prove
vagueness a plaintiff must show that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications. Ransdell knew that the abatement order and warrant contained information
about the removal of the vehicles and failed to avail himself of the administrative appeal
process. The Court used this fact to show that had Ransdell really thought the provision
was vague, he would have questioned the abatement notices earlier in the process. Also,
his procedural due process claim was without merit as the seizure was based on probable
cause and set forth with particularity. The reasonable nature of the abatement procedures
to protect public health and safety further validated the removal of these items. Equal
protection also did not apply to Ransdell because as a property owner he is not a member
of a protected class and he did not claim that he was the only individual to be targeted by
these specific code provisions.
Conclusion
The County’s action of abatement of property falls under the sovereign immunity
statute 41.032(2) because the process of abating a nuisance involves discretion and the
structure is in place in furtherance of public policy goals. Procedural and substantive due
process claims were also denied by the court as Ransdell was not denied reasonable and
fair procedural process and the terms of the County Code and warrant were not
unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court
in dismissing or entering summary judgment in favor of the county for the various tort
and constitutional claims of the plaintiff.
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